The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations | IPCS
Introduction: subcontinental perspectives on deterrence theory, international relations theory and South Asia / E. Sridharan; International relations theory and . Get this from a library! The India-Pakistan nuclear relationship: theories of deterrence and international relations. [Eswaran Sridharan; International Relations. India and Pakistan should exercise restraint, resume dialogue, E-International Relations Deterrence theory (Morghan ; Brodie ) rightly suggests two and regulating the regional and to some extent global security order. . of Strategic and Nuclear Studies at the National Defense University.
Therefore, it should have no anxiety about Indian BMD, as these technologies are complex and it will take decades before India achieves a reliable and effective system. Despite external and regional pressures, financial constraints and technological hurdles, Pakistan has been consistently modernizing its nuclear deterrence force to stabilize regional-centric deterrence against Indian conventional and non-conventional moves, thereby maintaining peace and avoiding war.
Pakistan has diversified its strategic force based on ballistic and cruise missiles from short range NASR, 60 km to intermediate range Saheen III 2, km. Nuclear deterrence has helped Pakistan to reduce its defense expenditures from 5. Nuclear weapons have become an affordable and cost-effective option to offset the Indian threat.
Pakistan spends the same allocation as a percentage of GDP 2.
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Pakistan cannot compete with India on a financial basis as it is facing serious economic constraints and has other priorities. However, without placing too much of a burden on its economy, Pakistan has to ensure the accuracy, surveillance, and effectiveness of its missiles system and the induction of new naval platforms.
What should the future course of action be for the region?
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
The Kashmir issue Cohen is the most complicated conflict, which may trigger aggression, leading to routine border skirmishes that may escalate into a future limited war, which could in turn potentially lead into a nuclear exchange. Besides Kashmir, the second important dimension is terrorism and extremism which redefined the threat spectrum and thereby complicated the regional security situation, and deepened mistrust after the terrorists attack on the Indian parliament and later Mumbai This shared threat cannot be addressed until the two states sit together and formulate joint regional security mechanism.
Realistically speaking, conflicting interests and the distinct aspirations of the two states are likely to incentivize further arms developments and prompt aggression and tension, thereby increasing the prospects of escalation to an undesirable level.
Indeed, advancements in nuclear delivery mechanisms do not stabilize the region; rather they contribute to the potential escalation of state insecurities.
It is urgent that the two states unilaterally increase efforts to institutionalize peace. Pakistan has to make a hard choice of keeping a modest and comprehensive program — without sliding into competition with India.
Over the next decade or so, Pakistan should focus on the knowledge based economy, political stability, social security, and scientific and technological developments within a peaceful and resilient democratic culture, thereby opening up a knowledge corridor with the US and European countries. The major focus should be on capacity building among youth — the linchpin of society — thereby turning them into resilient workforce. In the nuclear domain, Pakistan needs to establish education centers on nuclear escalation and nuclear use to generate greater public awareness and understanding of these issues.
The India-Pakistan nuclear relationship : theories of deterrence and international relations
Bilaterally, the two states need to build a stable political relationship while promoting trade and building cooperation. Both India and Pakistan should exercise maximum restraint, resume dialogue and institutionalize arms reduction mechanisms.
They should focus on devising diplomatic means for the settlement of the bilateral disputes, especially Kashmir. Both states need to understand that the use of total force and the concept of total victory are not achievable in the nuclear domain. How adequate are deterrence and neorealist theory, developed in the context of the US-Soviet Cold War, and what are the theoretical departures necessary in the South Asian context?
At the outset, it can be said that the contributors succeed in bringing to bear theory on the practice of deterrence in South Asia.
The scholars represented, from India and Pakistan, are a veritable who's who of the emerging generation of South Asian strategists. There is considerably writing on India's nuclear quest. At the forefront earlier was the status of the 'nuclear option'.
After Pokhran II, the focus shifted to the type of nuclear deterrence available to India like 'force-in-being'. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine was discussed threadbare and also by the anti-nuclear polemicists.
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Limited War thinking was developed. The earlier doctrine was one of non-weaponized deterrence or existential deterrence and this did not change overnight with weaponization, The Draft doctrine was only declared in Aug much after the nuclear tests.
Thinking about limited war was promoted by the Pakistani military action in Kargil and sponsored terrorism, which breached the Indian tolerance threshold after the attack on Parliament. Tests heralded weaponization, but Kargil and the Parliament attack came later, showing that nuclearization had not dampened Pakistani adventurism, but may have encouraged it.
Lastly, this situation led to enunciation of India's Cold Start doctrine.The Future of Alliances and Extended Nuclear Deterrence
The book under review has gone a step further by discussing nuclearization through the problems posed by the deterrence theory, and is therefore a recommended read. Sridharan opines that deterrence leading to peace stands the best chance under a particular combination of regimes; namely, with India being under a secular-liberal party while Pakistan has a version of moderate Islam.
He is of the view that India's nuclear policy is directed against a long term threat from China; against the discriminatory policies of declared nuclear powers; and long term security in an uncertain world order. He recommends resolving conflicts with Pakistan as they only box India into South Asia, and reduce its leverage in international forums. He expects that a fundamental resolution of disputes and moves towards greater South Asian integration would improve India's status in the world arena.
At the risk of being foolhardy, he even hazards conceptualizing an eventual joint South Asian deterrent! WPS Sidhu, a faculty member at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, who is well known for his earlier writings on the nuclear question, brings out the shortcomings of realist theory in the South Asian setting. Realism cannot explain why, after having tested inIndia did not choose to go nuclear or why the slow paced weaponization continues, despite China's head start.
He also brings out the shortcomings of deterrence theory as not being able to adequately explain why Indian armed forces launched conventional action in Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram that could have escalated. Deterrence theory is also limited to the triadic context of India-Pakistan-China, and is wanting in dealing with non-state armed groups and the self-deterrence within decision makers confronted with hard strategic choices.
His major insight lies in using organizational theory and strategic culture to explain the India-Pakistan contest.
He suggests that the crisis of has revealed that the gap between Pakistan's asymmetric warfare and a possible nuclear exchange is small. This is due to India's possible response by launching sub-conventional cross-LOC operations with retractable Special Forces that could have an escalatory potential.